The two successive electoral showdowns of 2012 (in May and June) created a completely new political landscape in Greece. Two years down the line, the European elections of 2014 were the first ‘national level’ elections in the country, and proved that the basic lines that were drawn in 2012 have deepened and stabilized.
It must be stated upfront that European elections are not identical to parliamentary elections. European elections are usually referred to as ‘second category’ elections in the bibliography, i.e. elections in which the overall stakes are lower because: a.) they do not produce governments and therefore do not determine the mandate to govern outright, and b.) they offer insights more into the ‘ideological’ preferences of voters as opposed to their ‘pragmatic’ political choices. Given this, the evidence from them should be seen more as ‘trends’ and not directly comparable to the results of parliamentary elections. All of the observations here should be considered ‘preliminary’ which in the coming days must be analyzed further.
The ‘electoral reckoning’ of the past two years resulted in the following general outcomes: a.) the electoral victory of a party of the radical left (SYRIZA), a fact of historic significance both for the Greek party system and at the European level, and indeed with a share of the vote almost equal to that obtained in the parliamentary elections, b.) the significant reduction in electoral support of the parties of the coalition government (New Democracy - PASOK/Elia) which fell by a combined 11.5%, a precipitous fall in the two years between elections, c.) the collapse in the support of the third coalition partner of 2012, DIMAR (Democratic Left) a fact which had been established at least a year earlier, d.) the confirmation of the electoral rise of Golden Dawn which is now a basic player in the party system and e.) the relatively disappointing results for parties such as the Independent Greeks, KKE (the Greek Communist Party) and the newly formed ‘center left’ To Potami (The River).
1. The participation in the elections / disillusionment with the political system
The European elections of 2014 took place a week after the first round of local and regional elections. The choice over the timing of the elections had an evident effect on voter participation on the second Sunday. As can be seen in detail in Table 1, compared to the 6,088,121 voters who took part in the first round of elections, 5,932,100 voters took part in the elections on the second Sunday, a difference of 156,021 people. In comparison to the June 2012 parliamentary elections the difference was 284,698 while in comparison to the parliamentary elections in May 2012 the difference reaches 544,718 people! The drop in voter participation contributed to the governing parties obtaining a slightly better apparent result, given that research into electoral behaviours shows that it is almost certain that an increase in voter participation would have favoured opposition parties. The goal of greater voter turnout was not achieved for leftist parties (chiefly SYRIZA).
Table 1: Voter participation in Greece, 1996-2014
| Elections |
Voter Turnout |
| PARLIAMENTARY 1996 |
6.978.656 |
| EUROPEAN 1999 |
6.712.684 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2000 |
7.026.527 |
| REGIONAL 2002 |
7.267.049 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2004 |
7.573.368 |
| EUROPEAN 2004 |
6.283.637 |
| REGIONAL 2006 |
7.110.538 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2007 |
7.355.026 |
| EUROPEAN 2009 |
5.261.355 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2009 |
7.044.479 |
| REGIONAL 2010 |
5.988.678 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2012 (Α) |
6.476.818 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2012 (Β) |
6.216.798 |
| REGIONAL 2014 |
6.088.121 |
| EUROPEAN 2014 |
5.932.100 |
Source: Interior Ministry election results
The actual abstention for the European elections was 28.5% whereas it was 27% for the first round of Regional / Municipal elections.
Of course the general trend remains of a steady reduction in voter turnout compared to the previous decade. Compared to the parliamentary elections of 2004, 1,641,268 fewer voters participated, resulting in historically high levels of voter abstention for Greece. The economic and social crises appear to have played a part in this as levels of trust in parliamentary politics and elections have fallen.
At the same time, as can be seen in Table 2, the number of blank / spoiled ballots has increased both in comparison to the previous round of European elections and of parliamentary elections.
Table 2: Blank / Spoiled Ballots 1996 - 2014
| Elections |
Number Blank / Spoiled Ballots |
Percentage (%) |
| PARLIAMENTARY 1996 |
198.607 |
2.8 |
| EUROPEAN 1999 |
283.988 |
4.2 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2000 |
158.516 |
2.2 |
| REGIONAL 2002 |
441.918 |
6.1 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2004 |
166.667 |
2.2 |
| EUROPEAN 2004 |
161.005 |
2.5 |
| REGIONAL 2006 |
467.015 |
6.6 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2007 |
196.020 |
2.7 |
| EUROPEAN 2009 |
133.818 |
2.5 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2009 |
186.137 |
2.6 |
| REGIONAL 2010 |
545.880 |
9.1 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2012 (Α) |
152.682 |
2.4 |
| PARLIAMENTARY 2012 (Β) |
61.334 |
1.0 |
| REGIONAL 2014 |
434.241 |
7.1 |
| EUROPEAN 2014 |
225.494 |
3.8 |
Source: Interior Ministry election results
2. Geographic data and the continuation of ‘class polarisation’
The European elections confirmed the changes to the party’s electoral bases. One could say that in effect they showed a stabilisation of the trends seen in the June 2012 elections which must now longer be thought of as transitionary. In contrast the social stratification of the vote in the European elections show that it was the picture that emerged from the May 2012 elections that was transitionary.
In Table 3 the geographic distribution of the vote is illustrated, showing the differing electoral bases of the parties and the deepening of social polarisation seen in the June 2012 elections. It is more correct to compare the percentage of the vote each party won in different areas with its percentage in urban areas as opposed to its nationwide result. What is clear to anyone is the completely different behaviour of voters in ‘working class’ neighborhoods compared to those in middle and high-income areas. The former tend to vote for SYRIZA and KKE in far greater numbers, while the latter have a statistically very significant preference for New Democracy (and To Potami to a lesser degree).
Table 3: The percentages obtained by different parties in selected areas
|
SYRIZA |
ND |
GD |
ELIA |
POTAMI |
KKE |
Ind.
Greeks |
| Overall % |
26.6 |
22.7 |
9.4 |
8.0 |
6.6 |
6.1 |
3.5 |
| Percentage in urban areas |
26.1 |
21.6 |
8.2 |
7.6 |
7.2 |
6.2 |
3.6 |
| High income areas |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Vouliagmeni |
16.0 |
41.5 |
7.4 |
5.3 |
8.9 |
2.6 |
4.5 |
| Voula |
19.9 |
36.6 |
6.8 |
5.8 |
8.8 |
3.0 |
3.8 |
| Psihiko |
13.2 |
49.8 |
5.9 |
5.4 |
8.7 |
2.0 |
1.6 |
| Filothei |
12.3 |
52.5 |
5.1 |
5.0 |
9.2 |
1.5 |
1.6 |
| Ekali |
7.8 |
59.0 |
4.6 |
4.2 |
7.4 |
1.4 |
1.9 |
| Average |
13.8 |
47.9 |
6.0 |
5.1 |
8.6 |
2.1 |
2.7 |
| ‘High-middle’ areas |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Cholargos |
27.4 |
24.9 |
7.3 |
6.7 |
8.1 |
5.0 |
3.2 |
| Ag. Paraskevi |
27.4 |
26.2 |
7.0 |
7.1 |
8.0 |
4.9 |
3.2 |
| Halandri |
27.3 |
25.6 |
7.0 |
6.4 |
8.7 |
5.6 |
3.1 |
| Vrilissia |
26.3 |
26.8 |
7.0 |
6.4 |
9.4 |
4.6 |
2.9 |
| Marousi |
27.1 |
25.3 |
7.3 |
6.8 |
8.8 |
5.3 |
3.4 |
| Average |
27.1 |
25.7 |
7.1 |
6.7 |
8.6 |
5.1 |
3.2 |
| ‘Middle’ Areas |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Hellinikon |
28.4 |
19.1 |
7.5 |
6.3 |
9.2 |
8.9 |
3.6 |
| Zografou |
29.2 |
22.3 |
8.0 |
7.4 |
7.0 |
7.6 |
3.0 |
| Galtasi |
30.8 |
17.8 |
8.8 |
6.7 |
7.9 |
8.1 |
3.3 |
| Vyronas |
32.6 |
18.9 |
8.0 |
6.3 |
7.2 |
9.2 |
3.1 |
| Average |
30.2 |
19.5 |
8.1 |
6.7 |
7.8 |
8.4 |
3.2 |
| ‘Working class’ areas |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Kamatero |
32.1 |
14.4 |
10.9 |
6.4 |
6.5 |
10.1 |
3.8 |
| Keratsini |
33.0 |
14.4 |
10.7 |
5.7 |
6.7 |
9.6 |
3.8 |
| Nikaia |
34.3 |
13.7 |
10.2 |
6.0 |
6.5 |
11.2 |
3.9 |
| Ag. Ioannis Renti |
34.3 |
15.1 |
12.1 |
5.4 |
6.1 |
7.4 |
4.1 |
| Peristeri |
34.9 |
15.6 |
9.6 |
5.6 |
6.4 |
9.9 |
3.6 |
| Aigaleo |
34.5 |
15.1 |
9.9 |
6.0 |
6.6 |
9.5 |
3.5 |
| Average |
33.8 |
14.7 |
10.6 |
5.8 |
6.4 |
9.6 |
3.8 |
Source: Interior Ministry election results
SYRIZA’s base is primarily made up of an alliance of working class and low-income voters. Due to the crisis however it has obtained a strong following among the middle class. In contrast it is almost completely marginalised in higher income areas. New Democracy’s support is a mirror image of this indicating a clear socio-political polarisation which marks the competition between the parties. New Democracy is far stronger in high income areas (in these areas one must also note the strong showing by other right leaning neo-liberal parties such as the Gefyres party) although its support has slipped dramatically in low-income areas, while it appears to also be losing the support of the ‘base’ of the middle class.
Golden Dawn draws its support primarily from working class and low and middle income areas. In contrast its support drops in upper and middle class areas. As a result it is a robust party which seeks a portion of the ‘working class anti-establishment’ vote.
To Potami, largely as expected, was primarily a protest-vote of upper and middle class areas. Elia appears to a have varied and not particularly robust base of support. It did better primarily in rural areas.
One final observation over the geographic distribution of voters: it does not appear to confirm a prediction made by one analyst that there would be a huge difference between working class voters and middle/upper class voters: a discontinuity. The data show that the distance (i.e. the polarisation) also includes a large part of the middle class. The European elections in other words show that the trend is for the ruling classes to be losing their base of support among the middle class, clearly due to the huge social and economic destruction of a large swathe of the middle class. It remains to be seen how this trend will develop in the coming months and in the run up to the next parliamentary elections.
3. The social characteristics of the vote - a continuation of the ‘class polarisation’
The geographic polarisation is confirmed by the social/professional stratification of the vote as it is depicted in table 4. Here one can more easily see the type of social/electoral alliances that are developing with the existing parties. The observations which arise must be seen, of course, through the lens of the enormous upheavals in the labour market over the past few years. The general trends which can be seen include a ‘turn’ towards the left on the part of salaried workers in the public sector and among the large reservoir of the unemployed, while the portion of the electorate employed in the private sector appears to be becoming more conservative.
Table 4: Party polling numbers for different professional and social groups
|
SYRIZA |
ND |
GD |
ELIA |
POTAMI |
KKE |
Ind.
Greeks |
| Overall |
26.6 |
22.7 |
9.4 |
8.0 |
6.6 |
6.1 |
3.5 |
| Employers / Entrepreneurs |
8.7 |
37.4 |
23.5 |
9.0 |
1.0 |
8.7 |
4.5 |
| Self employed famers |
37,5 |
22.5 |
10.0 |
7.5 |
5.0 |
10.0 |
2.5 |
| Self employed professionals (University Educated) |
21.0 |
22.0 |
11.0 |
2.2 |
7.7 |
4.4 |
5.5 |
| Professionals Technicians – Small scale retailers |
32.0 |
12.8 |
11.2 |
4.8 |
7.2 |
3.2 |
5.6 |
| Salaried Workers – Public sector |
43.5 |
7.2 |
2.9 |
7.2 |
10.1 |
5.8 |
1.4 |
| Salaried Workers – Private sector |
21.0 |
20.0 |
15.2 |
6.7 |
7.6 |
8.6 |
1.9 |
| First time unemployed |
27.3 |
9.1 |
18.2 |
9.1 |
15.0 |
9.0 |
2.5 |
| Long term unemployed |
36.3 |
12.9 |
12.9 |
2.4 |
5.6 |
7.3 |
1.4 |
| Stay-at-home mothers |
28.3 |
24.4 |
9.4 |
6.3 |
3.9 |
7.1 |
3.1 |
| Pensioners |
20.3 |
32.1 |
5.9 |
13.2 |
6.8 |
5.7 |
3.1 |
| Students |
44.0 |
12.0 |
0 |
4.0 |
4.0 |
4.0 |
3.0 |
Source: VPRC, Cumulative results of electoral surveys May 2014
As can be seen from the data, there is a major difference in the voting preferences of the unemployed and salaried workers in the public sector on one hand, and workers in the private sector on the other. In the first two categories SYRIZA has a clear advantage. In contrast among the salaried workers in the private sector (note: who are currently employed) New Democracy appears to prevail, while Golden Dawn is also influential. In other words it is possible that the makeup of today’s private sector has been altered.
Of course the image of voting preferences among those in the private sector primarily comes from those in middle and high-income positions. Among these groups SYRIZA obtains only a weak 11.8% and 13.8% respectively while New Democracy leads among both groups with 23.5% and 20% respectively, but with Golden Dawn obtaining extraordinarily high percentages with 20% and 14% respectively. Among the high-income workers in the private sector To Potami also has a high percentage with 12%.
In contrast among the lower level workers (basic office staff, unspecialized workers, specialized workers, part-time workers) SYRIZA is at 30% with the highest share of the vote among unspecialized workers (33.3%).
The social distribution of the vote demonstrate major shifts with regards to the post-dictatorship period. The social group consisting of self-employed farmers appears to be moving to the left (SYRIZA and KKE). However self-employed highly educated professionals (lawyers, engineers doctors etc) appear to be moving to the right, preferring New Democracy, To Potami and Golden Dawn by wide margins.
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